

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 23 Feb 1967
TO: [REDACTED]		
ROOM NO. 6 G 22.	BUILDING HQ	
REMARKS: <i>For your information with regard to what I propose to say. I would of course appreciate any corrections or comment that you may offer.</i> [REDACTED] <u>YAPER</u>		
FROM: [REDACTED]		
ROOM NO. 7 E 56	BUILDING HQ	EXTENSION 4021

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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Robert Amory's style of command and control was normally relaxed. Having assigned a task to a capable lieutenant, he expected it to be well done and did not interfere. If he were disappointed, however, he could make his displeasure known in no uncertain terms. 483/

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During Amory's tenure as Assistant Director, ORR continued to grow. Its actual strength of [redacted] in January 1952 increased to [redacted] in February 1953. 484/

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On 23 February 1953 Robert Amory became Deputy Director, Intelligence, in succession to Loftus Becker, and Otto Guthe, [redacted] became ADRR.

The Office of Current Intelligence

OCI was a third Office derived from ORE, but one that had not been originally contemplated. The Report of the NSC Survey Group had questioned the propriety of ORE's production of current intelligence and had strongly condemned its political research in duplication of that of the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research (OIR, formerly ORI). William Jackson had intended that OIR should have its pick of ORE's political analysts, after ONE had taken its choice, and that any not chosen by ONE or OIR should be declared surplus and dismissed. As it turned out, however, OCI was the haven in which the surplus analysts of ORE found refuge, to Jackson's great chagrin!

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The nucleus of OCI was the short-lived Office of Special Services (OSS), an attempt to organize more effectively the exploitation of communications intelligence in CIA. OCI was formed through the piecemeal accretion of former ORE functions and personnel to OSS.

Current Intelligence in CIA

Neither the President's Letter of 22 January 1946 nor the National Security Act of 1947 said anything about a current intelligence function in CIG or CIA. Every intelligence organization, however, produces current intelligence for the information of the authority that it serves. The day that CIG came into existence (on 8 February 1946, with the adoption of NIA Directives No. 1 and No. 2), President Truman impatiently demanded of it the immediate production of a daily summary of current intelligence. He wanted a single, all-sufficient daily summary to replace, at least insofar as he was concerned, the multiplicity of departmental summaries that he was required to read.* He received the first number of the CIG Daily Summary on 15 February, and was well pleased with it. 485/

* President Truman was a remarkably dutiful reader of intelligence. He desired the CIG Daily to summarize operational as well as intelligence information for his convenience, but was disappointed in that -- the War and Navy Departments refused to release operational information to CIG. State, on the other hand, furnished its most sensitive ("S/S") cables, under some restrictions with regard to their use.

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The Secretary of State (Mr. Byrnes) protested the publication of the CIG Daily Summary. In the circumstances of 1946 it was derived almost entirely from State cables, duplicating the State Department's daily summary. The President rejected that protest, saying that CIG was his own personal intelligence staff. The Secretary could only forbid CIG to comment on the significance of State cables, reserving that function to State. Not long afterward, however, President Truman demanded, and of course got, CIG comments on items in the CIG Daily Summary. 486/

CIA's publication of current intelligence was more formally sanctioned by NSCID No. 3, 13 January 1948. It provided that all intelligence agencies should produce and disseminate current intelligence as might be necessary to meet "their own internal requirements or external responsibilities." 487/ DCID 3/1, 8 July 1948, provided that current intelligence was not subject to coordination. 488/

|| // The NSC Survey Group noted that the CIA Daily Summary, Weekly Summary, and monthly Review of the World Situation* were almost

* This Review deserves passing notice. The first number was prepared by the Global Survey Group, ORE, as a briefing for Admiral Hillenkoetter to present to the newly constituted NSC, at its request. It was fully coordinated with the IAC agencies. Hillenkoetter was pleased with it and ordered it to be published as an estimate. The NSC was also pleased and requested that it be repeated on a monthly basis. When [redacted] attempted to coordinate subsequent numbers with the IAC agencies, they begged off, insisting that a monthly estimate was current intelligence. The true reason was that no IAC agency had anyone cognizant of the global situation. To coordinate with GSG each agency had to send a squad of regional specialists, and these regional specialists fell to quarreling among themselves as each sought preferment for his particular region. 489/ 25X1A

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entirely political in content. Probably at the instigation of OIR, it questioned the propriety of those publications and recommended their discontinuance. ^{490/} In response Admiral Hillenkoetter pointed out that they were the only current intelligence publications prepared expressly for the President and the NSC, as distinguished from specialized departmental audiences. ^{491/} He knew, as the NSC Survey Group apparently did not, that the Daily was prepared at the express direction of the President and the monthly Review at that of the NSC.

To General Smith it was as axiomatic as it had been to Admiral Hillenkoetter that CIA had a responsibility to keep the President currently informed. In October-November 1950 there was no question of discontinuing the CIA Daily Summary, but the current intelligence function was then transferred from ORR (late ORE) to ONE in accordance with [redacted] plan.* Langer then discontinued the Weekly and the monthly Review.

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Communications Intelligence in CIA^{**}

The other part of OCI's background has to do with the role of the DCI in relation to communications intelligence and the arrangements

* See above, p. 233.

** For a full treatment of this subject, see [redacted]
"History of SIGINT in CIA, 1947-70."

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made within CIA to control and exploit that highly sensitive source of information.

During the war, and for some time thereafter, the Army and Navy monopolized communications intelligence. The Navy confined itself to naval communications, but the Army took all else as its province and

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Thus it

was the Army, not State, that produced the Diplomatic Summary,

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This monopoly gave the Services, especially the Army, an immense advantage in joint intelligence estimating: "we know, for sure, something that you don't know." The Army was not disposed to yield that advantage to anyone, especially to CIG/CIA.

In December 1945 a coordinating body called STANCIB (State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board) was established. Since it could act only with unanimous consent, the Army's power to maintain its existing control of the source was assured. There was at that time no DCI. In June 1946 STANCIB became USCIB with the addition of the FBI (but not of CIG).

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* The Diplomatic Summary was edited by [REDACTED], who was afterwards a member of the General Division, ORE, the National Estimates Staff, and the Board of National Estimates.

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As Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Vandenberg was Chairman of the USCIB. When he became DCI, his successor, General Chamberlin, invited him to continue to sit in USCIB as a member. 492/ Thus the DCI gained a voice in the coordination of communications intelligence activities, but only as one among many, not was the authority responsible to the NIA for planning for the coordination of all intelligence activities.

To provide himself with staff support in his USCIB role, Vandenberg created the office of "Chief of the Advisory Council." This "Council" was nothing more than a small staff section concerned with representing CIG (CIA) in the USCIB substructure, obtaining CIG access to the Comint product of the military services, and controlling the use and security of Comint within CIG. 493/

In July 1947 the ADRE proposed the establishment of the "General Division" in ORE to handle communications intelligence on a securely compartmented basis. For some time, however, ORE had access only to the Army's Diplomatic Summary. It was not until April 1948 that the Army finally consented to allow CIA personnel to handle the raw take of communications intelligence on CIA premises. 494/

The USCIB was merely a voluntary association without any duly constituted authority. In December 1947 it was proposed to obtain for it the sanction of a Presidential Executive Order. There ensued a

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struggle between the Services and State, which now sought to wrest control from the Army. Admiral Hillenkoetter was strangely passive in this matter until 13 February 1948, when Secretary Forrestal declared that there was no need for an Executive Order, that the National Security Act of 1947 had given the DCI all the authority that was required. Hillenkoetter then proposed an NSCID that separated communications intelligence from other intelligence, but made the USCIB analogous to the IAC. Led by Admiral Inglis, the IAC amended that to make the USCIB directly subordinate to the NSC (not advisory to the DCI) -- which was, of course, the position that the IAC had been claiming for itself during the fall of 1947.* Hillenkoetter limply submitted this amended version to the NSC, but Sidney Souers, the Executive Secretary, remanded it as unacceptable. The IAC, however, refused to reconsider; in the end the NSC had to choose between Hillenkoetter's original draft and the IAC version. Contrary to Souers' expectation, the NSC adopted the IAC version in NSCID No. 9, 1 July 1948. 495/ Thus Admiral Inglis prevailed as regards communications intelligence.

Under the terms of NSCID No. 9, which required unanimous concurrence, the USCIB remained incapable of effecting any meaningful coordination. The Secretary of Defense thereupon proceeded to establish

* See above, pp. 63-64.

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the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) to rationalize the communications intelligence activities of the three Services under the direction of the JCS. 496/

The NSC Survey Group avoided intrusion into the sensitive area of communications intelligence. It expressed a suspicion that all was not well in that area, but hoped that the study then recently initiated by the Secretary of Defense would produce a solution. (It produced AFSA.) The Survey Group's only suggestion was that the DCI be made permanent chairman of USCIB. 497/ Hillenkoetter, in his comments, declined that empty honor. In a Board that could act only by unanimous consent, it did not matter who was chairman. 498/

The Office of Special Services

Such was the situation with regard to communications intelligence when Bedell Smith became DCI. His first concern was to pull together under one clear command authority the several elements in CIA concerned with Comint. He did that by combining the functions and personnel of the Advisory Council and the Special Research Center* into one Office of Special Services (OSS). The creation of that Office was announced on 1 December 1950. 499/

* The Special Research Center was not a command, but a place, the secure area that housed both the General Division of ORE and [redacted]

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With the former General Division of ORE, OSS acquired from
[redacted] two current intelligence publications. They were the Daily
Korean Summary, derived in part from communications intelligence,
and the Weekly Situation Summary, derived entirely from that source. 500/

The first Assistant Director for Special Services was [redacted]

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25X1A [redacted] who had been Chief of the Advisory Council since August 1950,
but, after only a month as Assistant Director, [redacted] was transferred
to the Office of Training and [redacted] was appointed ADSS in
his stead. 501/

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The Creation of OCI

On 18 December 1950 William Jackson announced that he was now ready to take up the problem of current intelligence. 502/ Three days later he met with Langer, [REDACTED] and Babbitt to consider the proper location of that function in CIA. 503/ Babbitt contended that current intelligence could not properly be produced without immediately available research support. That was ORE doctrine. Jackson angrily accused Babbitt of trying to perpetuate ORE in ORR, and Babbitt acknowledged that to be true. Jackson could not be expected to agree to that conception.* Langer, for his part, did not want to be responsible for current intelligence, if ONE could otherwise be assured of prompt access to the "S/S" cables. Saying that, he resigned the current intelligence function to OSS. 504/

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As soon as Kingman Douglass took office, he put his staff to work on trial runs for a new all-source Daily. 505/ When [REDACTED] learned of that, he protested vigorously, 506/ but in vain. On 12 January it was announced that "OCI" would produce the Daily Summary. 507/ Three days later the name of OSS was publicly changed to Office of Current Intelligence. 508/

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In this case, OCI got the function without the personnel; the experienced staff that [REDACTED] had selected out of ORE (ORR)

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* Nevertheless, Babbitt's conception ultimately prevailed in the actual development of OCI. See below, pp. 280-282.

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remained in ONE. ██████████ continued to publish the CIA Daily Summary until 28 February, when OCI, after two months of practice, finally put out the first number of its new Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB). 509/ It was not until two months later that Bedell Smith finally declared himself to be entirely satisfied with the CIB. 510/*

Bedell Smith sent a copy of the first number of the CIB to the Secretary of State with a note emphasizing that it was an all-source publication, not just a summary of State Department cables, as the former Daily Summary had been. 511/ He sought thus to answer State's repeated complaints about the publication of "political summaries" by CIA. The difference was attributable as much to the Korean War as to the reorganization of CIA. The war had produced military traffic and communications intelligence of interest at the Presidential level, which had not been the case before.

OCI and the CIB were a good, albeit belated, response to the new current intelligence requirements generated by the war. Current intelligence was necessarily a very incidental function in ONE. Moreover ONE, separated from the former General Division of ORE, was not in a position to handle communications intelligence on a current basis. On the other hand, the single-source OSS was too narrowly

* In August 1951 OCI supplemented the daily CIB with an all-source weekly Current Intelligence Review.

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informed to perform the task well. OCI was not limited in that way, but it still had to find the integral research support that Babbitt, with reason, had declared to be indispensable to the proper performance of the current intelligence function.

Political Research in CIA

ORE had felt free to engage in any research that it deemed to be useful in the service of the President, the NSC, any defense-related Government agency that had no intelligence capabilities of its own (e.g., the NSRB), or, of course, the other components of CIA (e.g., OSO). It was disposed to rely on the military intelligence agencies for technical military data, but, with reason, had only scorn for their strongly held, but extremely naive, political views. ORE's regard for the political interpretations of the State Department's CIR was not much higher. It knew that OIR was a pariah within the Department. Relations between ORE and OIR were poisoned by OIR's resentment of ORE's intrusion into the field of political intelligence, and by ORE's resentment of OIR's consequently captious criticisms intended to demonstrate the incompetence of ORE. 512/

The NSC Survey Group was strongly sympathetic with OIR in this matter. It held most emphatically that CIA should engage in no political intelligence research whatever 513/ -- and political intelligence could be construed to cover everything except the most narrowly and technically defined scientific, economic, and military matters.

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At his first formal meeting with the IAC, Bedell Smith was as emphatic in stating that CIA (ORR) would not thereafter engage in political intelligence research. 514/

During the next three months William Jackson and Park Armstrong discussed the practical consequences of that determination. Then, on 1 February 1951, Bedell Smith despatched a letter to the Secretary of State reminding him that NSCID No. 3 made the Department of State primarily responsible for political, cultural, and sociological intelligence research, informing him that CIA, relying on State, was no longer engaged in such research, and suggesting to him that the State Department might have to increase its intelligence research staff in order to meet the requirements of CIA and the other IAC agencies for political research support. 515/

Jackson's letter of the same date to Armstrong was more explicit. State (OIR) was now responsible for the political, cultural, and sociological work formerly done by ORE, including (a) the initiation of appropriate collection requirements, (b) the evaluation of OSO reports, (c) research to meet the requirements of the NSC, the JCS, and the other Departments, (d) intelligence support for psychological warfare, (e) research on international organizations -- e.g., the UN, (f) research on International Communism, and (g) research support for CIA. To aid State in meeting these responsibilities, CIA

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would provide State with funds for 150 additional positions for the remainder of the fiscal year, and would transfer to State surplus personnel from ORE. 516/*

At the same time Jackson forwarded to Armstrong a request from the Joint Staff to CIA for material for a JJC psychological warfare intelligence estimate, requesting that OIR respond to it. 518/ Two months having passed without a response, the Joint Staff again addressed ~~the~~ DCI. Smith passed that inquiry on to Armstrong for direct response. 519/

Thus Smith and Jackson were firmly determined to take literally State's claim to a monopoly of political intelligence research, to permit nothing of that sort to be done in CIA under any pretext, to require all requests for political research support to be addressed to State, and to require State to respond directly to the requestors.

The denouement came in June 1951, when Armstrong addressed an appeal to Smith. State had included in its 1952 supplemental budget 250 positions required to meet the additional responsibilities set

* Quite apart from this transitional arrangement, CIA included in its Fiscal 1952 budget presentation [redacted] for budgetary support to OIR for its contribution to the NIS program. 517/ This budgetary support was continued for many years. During most of the fiscal year OIR used for its general purposes the personnel thus paid for by CIA. Then, toward the end of the fiscal year, it became almost impossible to get from OIR a contribution to an NIE because all hands were working frantically to make up OIR's NIS quota.

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forth in Jackson's letter of 1 February. The Bureau of the Budget had allowed only 40 percent of the positions and 31 percent of the funds requested for this purpose. The reason was that the surplus personnel of ORE had been absorbed in CIA, instead of being transferred to State, so that the proposed increase in OIR's personnel strength was an addition to the Federal payroll. Would the DCI

25X1A please intervene with the Bureau of the Budget on State's behalf? 520/

Actually, about 5 of ORE's surplus personnel had been transferred from ORR to OIR, while [redacted] had been transferred from ORR to OCI. 521/ Jackson was deeply chagrinned to learn that, but Kingman Douglass knew what he was doing. He was acquiring the integral research support that Babbitt had declared to be indispensable to the proper production of current intelligence.

But more than research support for current intelligence was involved. The fact is that no sooner had ORE disappeared than it was sorely missed, especially by OSO. As early as 13 February OSO expressed its concern at being made dependent on OIR for political research support, especially as regards the integrated study of the ramifications of the International Communist Conspiracy. 522/ ORE had performed that service for OSO; in his letter of 1 February Jackson had listed it specifically as one of the ORE functions to be assumed by State. OIR, however, was extremely reluctant to take up that task; by May it was apparent that it would not do so. 523/

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(OIR regarded the product as domestic propaganda rather than intelligence.) There ensued, in the Deputy Director's daily staff meeting, earnest discussion of the proper location in CIA of a unit to render operational research support to OSO and OPC, and significantly, in that connection, of the amount of research that could appropriately be done in OCI. 524/

This trend of thought alarmed William Jackson. He expressed to the Director his concern about the development of research tendencies in OCI and proposed to inspect that Office, with the apparent intention of arresting that development. Bedell Smith authorized that inspection, but stressed the point that Assistant Directors should be permitted to organize and run their Offices as they thought best, so long as they produced the desired results. 525/

25X1A In the end, it was [redacted] who made the inspection of OCI, as a practice run before his formal appointment as Inspector General.* His report, dated 7 December 1951, suggested some few administrative improvements. [redacted] did not concern himself with the doctrinal principle that had concerned Jackson.

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In late November Allen Dulles spoke up to question the propriety of OCI's unilateral reporting on purely political matters in the CIB. He suggested prior coordination with OIR in such cases. **

* See above, pp. 186-87.

** Almost certainly this intervention was prompted by Park Armstrong. Dulles and Armstrong had been in close rapport at least since 1948. See above, p. 76.

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Bedell Smith answered curtly that the purpose of the CIB was to report on every matter that CIA thought should be brought to the President's attention, and that the President had so directed. 526/

Thus it was that the development of "research tendencies" in OCI went unchecked and OCI became an independent political research organization comparable to ORR. Although ORR was, administratively, the continuation of ORR, OIR (and ONE) came to realize that ORR had actually survived in OCI. 527/

By 1 January 1952 OCI had an actual personnel strength of
25X1A [redacted] 528/ of whom 70 percent were transfers from ORR (ORR) and

30 percent were new recruits. The bulk of this strength was organized into four regional divisions: Soviet, Far East, Near East-Africa, and Western. There were also a Special Support Staff exercising the functions of the former Advisory Council and an Intelligence Staff which maintained the CIA Situation Room and supported the IAC Watch Committee.* The four regional divisions followed the developing situation in their respective areas on an all-source basis and prepared copy for the daily Current Intelligence Bulletin and the weekly Current Intelligence Review. The material that they submitted was reviewed and accepted, modified, or rejected by a Publications Board composed ^{before} ~~of~~ ^{Chmn} ~~the~~ ^{Alce} of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff and the four division chiefs. ^(See below) A subordinate editorial staff ^{+ Secretariat} then perfected the English and attended ^{to} ~~for~~ ¹¹¹ to reproduction and dissemination. 529/

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See below pp. 294, 96

Bad Blood Between OCI and ONE

The spirit of ORE still dwelt in OCI. The prevailing doctrine in ORE was ^{that} the ultimate authority on any subject was the desk man who studied it daily -- even though he might be in rank and experience the most junior person concerned. Pure truth resided only in his independent, well-informed, and expert judgment. Any higher-level review must necessarily introduce adulteration; the higher the rank of the reviewer, the less well informed he would be. And any deference to the views of other agencies in interdepartmental coordination was shameless prostitution. This ORE view became the prevailing view in OCI, at least among the analysts. 530/

! !
a little
surprise

This unofficial, but nevertheless prevailing, view was, of course, diametrically opposite to the doctrine of William Jackson and to the conception of ONE, which included review by a distinguished Board of National Estimates as well as interdepartmental coordination.

This philosophical difference between OCI and ONE was sharpened by personal animus. The personnel of the National Estimates Staff were the elect of ORE. The personnel of OCI were the rejected, those not wanted in ONE, or ORR, or OSO and OPC. They could assuage their feelings, however, by thinking

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of themselves as the purveyors of pure truth in the service of the President, in contrast to those coordinators in ONE, hopelessly entangled in their time-consuming and humiliating procedures.

The conflict that ensued between ONE and OCI was perhaps inherent in the difference between their respective functions in dealing with the same subject matter, but its intensity can be fully understood only with reference to this psychological background.

On 13 February 1951, two weeks before the publication of the first number of the CIB, General Smith declared that it was to be a "joint production" prepared by OCI in collaboration with ONE, ORR, and OSI.* 532/ Subsequently the OCI Publications Board considered occasional contributions from ORR or OSI on economic and scientific subjects, on the same basis as contributions from the regional divisions of OCI. ONE never submitted such contributions, and OCI never voluntarily consulted ONE.

From the outset the CIB contained "CIA" (that is, OCI) comments on the significance of the items reported. Bedell Smith tried to

* He said also that he wanted the CIB to be on his desk "first thing in the morning," which meant that it would have to be produced before the beginning of the normal working day. Since 1946 the CIA Daily had been published at noon, on the principle that a morning paper can publish only yesterday's news, while a midday paper can publish today's news from the Eastern Hemisphere. 531/ Either no one present understood that point, or no one dared to point it out to General Smith.

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explain the standing of those comments in his letter to the Secretary of State transmitting the first number of the CIE.*

It should be emphasized he wrote that the comments do not necessarily represent the mature appreciation of the Central Intelligence Agency and have not been coordinated with the other intelligence agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. They are actually the first impressions of CIA on "spot" information and are subject to later revision.

In the opinion of ONE, OCI's "CIA comments" were often ill-considered and misleading. More particularly, ONE observed that many of them contained right far-reaching estimates, and that some of these estimates, published by OCI in the name of CIA, flagrantly contradicted national intelligence estimates recently published in the name of the DCI.

In May 1951 Langer complained to Douglass about this "casual estimating" in a current intelligence publication, 533/ but his remonstrance had no apparent effect.

In June Langer complained to Jackson, who brought the matter to Smith's attention. Smith's response was that Langer, who knew that OCI would be commenting in the name of CIA, "should take the necessary steps for coordination" 534/ -- that is, any lack of internal coordination was Langer's fault.

* See above, p. 276.

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That remark was not understood at the time; certainly nothing was done in response to it. Smith seemed to have inverted the standard rule of coordination, that he who would publish a statement must himself seek and obtain the concurrence of other interested parties. What Smith meant can be understood only with reference to the special circumstances of this case. He meant that it would be unreasonable to expect OCI, working to a before-office-hours deadline, to withhold comment because it could not coordinate with ONE, no one in ONE having yet come to work. If Langer objected to what OCI was saying, he should arrange to have an ONE representative available to be consulted by OCI's "dawn patrol."

Jackson brought the subject up again in July, and this time Smith made himself clear: someone from ONE should monitor OCI's production. [REDACTED] was immediately appointed to sit with the OCI Publications Board. 535/* 25X1A

25X1A Apparently [REDACTED] was not able to control OCI's estimative tendencies. In September Langer again complained about OCI estimates, this time to Dulles, the new DDCI. Dulles had evidently been receiving

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* [REDACTED] had been Deputy Chief of the East European Division in ORE and was in 1951 a "generalist" in ONE. He served also as ONE's watchdog with the Watch Committee. See below, pp. 296.

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similar complaints from Armstrong (State).^{*} It appears that Dulles proposed that OCI be forbidden to comment on current intelligence. Smith and Jackson^{**} both jumped on him for that, declaring that the President wanted CIA comments. [redacted] was supposed to control their estimative content. Smith added that he was not excited about any minor inconsistencies between OCI's "flash" comments and ONE's deliberately considered estimates. The difference in standing between those two forms of expression should be obvious to all concerned. 536/ 25X1A

This dismissal of the subject did not quiet ONE's complaints. A month later [redacted] and Becker thought that Jackson ought to investigate the embattled relations between ONE and OCI. 537/ In March 1952 the new ADNE, Sherman Kent, reported to the new DDI, Loftus Becker, that, whereas ONE's relations with ORR and OSI were excellent, its relations with OCI left much to be desired. ONE's last words on the subject of "CIA" comment in current intelligence publications were as follows:

Evaluation and comment on raw intelligence currently reported is essential. It is undesirable on the other hand to pass on to high officials of the government estimates hastily produced by a single

* See above, pp. 281-82.

** Present as the DCI's Senior Consultant.

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CIA office which does not represent and may actually conflict with considered and coordinated judgments. In practice, the distinction between evaluation of intelligence and the drawing of estimates is difficult to maintain and O/CI comments in the CIA Daily and Weekly publications frequently ignore the distinction.... Up to now CIA current publications often seem to have ignored the agreed views of the IAC agencies as expressed in national intelligence estimates. 538/

Another aspect of this problem was OCI's complaint, first made in December 1951, that it was allowed no voice in the preparation of national intelligence estimates. 539/*

ONE understood that its drafts for national intelligence estimates were to be based on its evaluation of contributions received from the IAC agencies and from ORR and OSI as accepted "services of common concern." It knew that OCI's political research was a bootleg operation without acceptance and standing in the IAC community. It considered itself sufficiently informed by OCI's current intelligence publications, and had no regard for OCI's estimative judgment. 540/

The issue being raised, however, Sherman Kent was accommodating. He invited OCI comment on the contributions received by ONE and the drafts prepared by ONE, and OCI representation at all meetings of the

* The specific occasion was OCI's criticism of a draft for NIE 46 (Iran). Becker's subsequent criticism of that estimate as finally adopted by the DCI and IAC (see above, p. 249) was evidently inspired by OCI.

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Board of National Estimates to review both terms of reference and draft estimates. He told the ADCI "I wish to assure you of the Board's interest in having your people participate as much and as directly as possible, and always as members of the family." 541/

In taking this conciliatory line, Kent sought to develop a better spirit of collaboration between ONE and OCI -- or else to create a sharp contrast between ONE's willingness to consider the views of OCI and OCI's disregard of the views of ONE. OCI took some advantage of the opportunity to make disparaging comments on Departmental contributions and ONE drafts, but would not attend meetings with the Board. In short, OCI was ever ready to criticize, but not to enter into joint discussion of the subject. 542/ Why not? Did it fear to compromise its independence? -- or to be worsted in argument? -- or to be arbitrarily overruled by the Board?

A third aspect of this problem was the estimative content of OCI special memoranda prepared for the information of the DCI or the President. Requests for such memoranda on particular subjects were usually referred to ONE when it was perceived that major estimative judgments were involved, but OCI got the bulk of that trade for the simple reason that OCI, with its integral research facilities, could produce "factual" information faster than ONE could.

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On 1 February 1952 Kent sought to get this matter under some control by proposing to Douglass that each Office should supply the other with copies of all of the intelligence memoranda that it produced for the DCI, the DDCI, or the DDI. 543/ At the same time he proposed to Becker that, if a current situation threatened to develop into a crisis requiring estimative judgment, the DDI should form a joint OCI-ONE "Task Team" to deal with it. OCI would be responsible for the initial reporting, keeping ONE fully informed, but, when a "spot estimate" was judged to be needed, the action would pass to ONE, with the "factual" support of OCI and with OCI's participation in the Board's consideration of the subject. 544/

It appears that nothing came of this initiative, for in July
25X1A [REDACTED] (then Acting ADNE) returned to the subject with a simpler proposal. He urged Becker to establish the principle that every intelligence memorandum destined for the White House or the NSC should be reviewed by the Board of National Estimates. He suggested that all requests for such memoranda should be referred to OCI for the preparation of a first draft, but that all OCI drafts should be reviewed by the Board with the ADCI sitting as an ad hoc member. 545/

25X1A Becker's decision on [REDACTED] proposal was that intelligence memoranda for the White House might be prepared by either Office, according to the nature of the request, but that all such memoranda

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should be reviewed by the Board of National Estimates and ADCI, acting jointly. The ADCI would be supported by the appropriate members of the OCI Publications Board. 546/

25X9□

By this time there was a new ADCI, Huntingdon Sheldon.

25X9□




25X9□ Kingman Douglass recruited him to be his successor as ADCI. Sheldon was appointed Deputy ADCI in June 1952 and succeeded Douglass on 12 July.*

Sheldon's subordinates in OCI regarded him as a strong and forceful character, unquestionably in complete command of OCI, as Douglass had not been. 547/ On the other hand, Sherman Kent later said that dealing with Sheldon was like pressing upon a pillow:

* Sheldon subsequently pursued a distinguished career in CIA. He normally served as Acting DDI during Amory's absences, but did not succeed Amory in that office. He was appointed Assistant DDI under Cline (April 1962) and afterwards Special Assistant to the DDS&P (November 1963). In that position he was actually a special assistant to the DCI for various important and sensitive tasks.

25X9□



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there was no resistance, but also no lasting effect. 548/ In short, Sheldon would agreeably appear to acquiesce in whatever was proposed to him, but then do as he pleased as though nothing had been said.

In August 1952 CIA was committed to briefing the two principal candidates for the Presidency on foreign situations related to the national security. Kent understood that these briefings would be prepared in accordance with Becker's decision on 25 July: that is, that OCI would prepare briefings on the current situation in the countries under consideration on each occasion, that ONE would prepare estimative paragraphs to be attached to OCI's country briefings, and that the Board and the ADCI would meet to review and combine these drafts. Sheldon apparently acquiesced in this idea, for he asked that the meeting be kept small, that the whole Board not attend. Apparently he was concerned lest the OCI delegation be heavily outnumbered. 549/

It did not work out that way. In casual conversation with Sheldon at lunch, Kent was astonished to learn that OCI had already briefed one of the candidates without consulting ONE. Naturally, Sheldon was reluctant to give a different briefing to the other. Kent, however, insisted in going through with the agreed procedure

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and understood that Sheldon finally acquiesced. Nevertheless, when Sheldon was later notified of the time of the Board meeting, he flatly refused to attend. His position was that he had no interest in what ONE might choose to say on the subject, and that what OCI had said or might say was none of ONE's business. 550/

On Sunday, 10 August, the Board of National Estimates met to review the OCI and ONE drafts. Becker, the DDI, was present. Becker certainly was not partial toward ONE.* He was impressed, however, by the cooperative attitude of the Board, and by the refusal of OCI to participate. 551/

In September Sheldon told Amory (then the Acting DDI) that Becker had authorized OCI to make short-term (up to six months) estimates. 552/ If so, that was no solution of the problem, which concerned the distinction between evaluating the credibility of a report and estimating the likely consequences of the reported fact.**

On 25 October [redacted] obtained from Becker, in Sheldon's presence, 25X1A a reaffirmation of Becker's decision of 25 July. 553/ That made no difference. Sheldon simply ignored it.

This issue was never officially resolved, in General Smith's view or later. It did, however, fade away. In ONE it was thought significant that the trouble subsided not long after [redacted] Douglass's Chairman of the OCI Publications Board, was transferred 25X1A

* See above, pp. 164-61a and 248-51

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** See above, p. 289.

25X1A

from OCI to the Office of Training, in July 1952. 554/ [redacted] had been a division chief in ORE.

25X9□

25X9□

The Watch Committee of the IAC

One of OCI's important functions was to provide CIA support for the Watch Committee of the IAC.

The failure of Intelligence to give warning of the impending attack on South Korea in June 1950 stimulated the development of mechanisms intended to give timely warning of any military attack likely to affect the security interests of the United States. The Joint Intelligence Committee established a Joint Intelligence Indications Committee, of which Brigadier General John Weckerling, the Chief of the Intelligence Division, Army G-2, was chairman. At the same time CIA developed an interdepartmental "Check List Group" with an identical function: to compile a check list of specific actions indicative of the imminence of military operations, and to give warning if any significant combination of these listed indications was seen to be occurring.

On 24 November 1950 James Reber (Acting Secretary, IAC) proposed, with the concurrence of the Standing Committee of the IAC, that the "Check List Group" be formally established as the Watch Committee of the IAC, under the chairmanship of CIA. 555/

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Soon afterward Reber learned that the military members of the IAC would resist this proposal, presumably out of jealous concern for the JIIC and on the ground that warning of impending attack was a military function not to be entrusted to civilians. It should also be noted that [redacted]

25X1D

25X1D

[redacted] In accordance with the maxim "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em," Reber recommended to General Smith that the "Check List Group" be scrapped, and that the JIIC be made the Watch Committee of the IAC. 556/

When the IAC met to consider this matter, on the ninth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, General Smith declared that he was responsible to see to it that the Government had an effective Watch Committee, but that it need not be headed by CIA. He withdrew the proposal before the house, announced the dissolution of the "Check List Group," and proposed that the JIIC be established as the Watch Committee of the IAC with its membership expanded to include all members of the IAC. 557/

The military were delighted, of course. General Bolling, the G-2, hastened to have the JIC charter of the JIIC rescinded and to propose to the IAC a suitably modified charter for the Watch Committee. 558/ It was adopted on 28 December 1950. 559/

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It was agreed that Watch Committee reports should be strictly factual, with evaluative comments, of course, but no estimating. 560/ This was a delicate matter, similar to that at issue between OCI and ONE.* Inevitably, estimates sometimes crept into Watch Committee reports. The members of the IAC, however, were as jealous as ONE of their prerogative to do any estimating that was done. Consequently any objection to the appearance of an estimate in a Watch Report was generally sufficient to obtain its immediate deletion by the IAC. 561/

General Weckerling served as Chairman of the Watch Committee until August 1952 and was succeeded by Brigadier General John Willems, his successor in Army G-2.**

General Smith listed the establishment of the Watch Committee among his major achievements, but retained a realistic view of what it could be expected to accomplish. As he put it to the NSC:

Despite the utmost vigilance, despite watch committees, and all of the other mechanisms for the prompt evaluation and transmission of intelligence, there is no real assurance that, in the event of sudden undeclared hostilities, certain advance warning can be given. 562/

25X1A

* OCI represented CIA in the Watch Committee, but [REDACTED] went along as watchdog for ONE.

** Eventually, in 1954, the DDCI (then General Cabell) became Chairman of the Watch Committee. In 1965, when General Carter retired as DDCI, Huntingdon Sheldon became the first civilian Chairman.

Appendix B (Continued)

485. Author's recollection. The author was in charge of the production of the CIC Daily Summary.
486. Ibid.
487. NSCID No. 3, 13 Jan 48, USIB Secretariat. *classif?*
488. DCID 3/1, 8 Jul 48, USIB Secretariat.
- 25X1A 489. [REDACTED] "Intelligence Service, 1940-1950" — *read* (25, above), pp. 57-59.
490. Dulles, Jackson, and Correa, Report to the NSC (101, above), pp. 84-86, 92.
491. "Comments by the Central Intelligence Agency..." (116, above), p. 26.
- 25X1A 492. [REDACTED] "History of SIGINT in CIA," I, 23-24.
493. Ibid., I, 25-26.
494. Ibid., I, 36-39.
495. Ibid., I, 56-65.
496. Ibid., I, 66
497. Dulles, Jackson, and Correa, Report to the NSC (101, above), pp. 58-60.
498. "Comments by the Central Intelligence Agency..." (116, above), p. 15.
499. General Order No. 38, 1 Dec 50, CIA Archives.
- 25X1A — 500. [REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above), VII, 35. *in clst?*
501. General Order No. 40, 1 Jan 51, CIA Archives.
502. SC-M-1, 18 Dec 50 (223, above, Envelope 1).
503. Minutes, Daily Staff Meeting, 21 Dec 50 (198, above, Envelope 4).
504. Author's recollection and comment.

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505. SC-M-4, 8 Jan 51 (223, above, Envelope 1).
- 25X1A 506. Memo, [REDACTED] to W. L. Langer, "The CIA Daily Summary," 9 Jan 51, HS/HC-296.
507. Minutes, Daily Staff Meeting, 12 Jan 51 (198, above, Envelope 4).
508. General Order No. 41, 15 Jan 51, CIA Archives.
- 25X1A 509. [REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above) VIII, 35.
510. SC-M-17, 30 Apr 51 (223, above, Envelope 1).
511. Letter, W. B. Smith, DCI, to the Secretary of State, 28 Feb 51, CIA Records Center, Job No. 59-780, Box 1.
512. Author's recollection and comment.
513. Dulles, Jackson, and Correa, Report to the NSC (101, above), pp. 87, 92.
514. IAC-M-1, 20 Oct 50, USIB Secretariat.
515. Letter, W. B. Smith, DCI, to the Secretary of State, 1 Feb 51 (511, above).
516. Letter, W. H. Jackson, DDCI, to Park Armstrong, 1 Feb 51 (511, above).
517. Letter, W. B. Smith to Park Armstrong, 6 Apr 51 (511, above).
518. Letter, Jackson to Armstrong, 29 Jan 51 (511, above).
519. Letter, Smith to Armstrong, 21 Mar 51 (511, above).
520. Letter, Armstrong to Smith, 22 Jun 51 (511, above).
- 25X1A 521. [REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above) VIII, 27.
522. Minutes, Daily Staff Meeting, 13 Feb 51 (198, above, Envelope 4).
523. Ibid., 16 May 51.
524. Ibid., 24 May 51.
525. Minutes, Director's Meeting, 23 May 51 (232, above, Envelope 5).

526. Ibid., 23 Nov 51 (Envelope 7).
527. Author's recollection of OIR comment on the subject.
528. Office of Personnel statistics on file in O/DDI/A. 25X1A
529. [REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above), VIII, 31-34, and Annex B, Tab 6.
530. Author's recollection.
531. [REDACTED] "Intelligence Service, 1940-1950" (25, above), p. 35.
- 25X1A 532. SC-M-8, 12 Feb 51 (223, above, Envelope 1). 25X1A
- 25X1A 533. Memo, Langer to Douglass, 22 May 51, cited in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above), VIII, 41.
534. Minutes, Director's Meeting, 27 Jun 51 (232, above, Envelope 5).
535. Ibid., 16 and 17 July 51.
536. Ibid., 7 Sep 51 (Envelope 7).
537. The Executive Assistant's Official Diary, 13 Oct 51 (290, above).
538. ONE, "Statement of Activities and Problems," 1 Mar 52, HS/HC-112, item 19.
539. Official Diary, 19 Dec 51 (290, above).
540. Author's recollection and comment. See also ONE, "Activities and Problems" (538, above).
541. Memo from Kent, ADNE, to the ADCI (Douglass), "Inter-Office Relationships in the Production of NIE's," 1 Feb 52, HS/HC-112, item 25.
- 25X1A 542. Author's recollection and comment. Sherman Kent to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 12 Feb 71. 25X1A
543. Memo from Kent, ADNE, to the ADCI, 1 Feb 52 (541, above).
- 25X1A 544. Memo from Kent, ADNE, to the DDI (Becker), "Procedure for Making Spot Estimates," 31 Jan 52, HS/HC-112, item 25.
545. Memo from [REDACTED] Acting ADNE, to the DDI, "Intra-CIA Coordination of Intelligence Memoranda Prepared for the White House and the NSC," 22 Jul 52, HS/HC-112, item 9.

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546. DDI Diary, 25 Jul 52 (199, above).
- 25X1A 547. [REDACTED] 17 Feb 71.
548. Sherman Kent to [REDACTED] 12 Feb 71. 25X1A
549. Sherman Kent, Memo for Record, 30 Sep 52, HS/HC-112, item 5.
550. Ibid.
551. DDI Diary, 10 Aug 52 (199, above).
552. Ibid., 19 Sep 52.
- 25X1A 553. [REDACTED] note on a copy of Kent's Memo for Record (549, above).
- 25X1A 554. Kent to [REDACTED] 12 Feb 71.
555. IAC-D-6, 24 Nov 50, USIB Secretariat.
- 25X1A 556. [REDACTED] "Organizational History" (237, above), VIII, 46-49.
557. IAC-M-10, 7 Dec 50, USIB Secretariat.
558. IAC-D-61/2, 27 Dec 50, USIB Secretariat.
559. IAC-M-12, 28 Dec 50, USIB Secretariat.
560. IAC-M-11, 21 Dec 50, USIB Secretariat.
561. Author's recollection of such occasions.
562. W. B. Smith, Report to the NSC (431, above).